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This study examines the experiences of social risks such as unemployment, decrease 
in income, decrease in property, weakening family bonds, deterioration of health and their 
effects on middle class identification, and self-identified social stratification during the 
Korean financial crisis. The financial crisis in 1997 fundamentally transformed the density 
of the middle class and middle class identification declined rapidly in Korea. This study has 
found that unemployment was the strongest factor to significantly reduce middle class 
identification. The association between social risks and self-ranked social stratum also 
reveal the negative impact of economic crisis. Social risks such as unemployment and the 
deterioration of health around the economic crisis turned out to be significant factors in 
Koreans lowering their own social stratum ten years after economic crisis. Job instability 
also had a lasting impact on being ranking themselves lower on the social stratum. This 
study concludes that after the economic crisis, employment, job stability and physical 
health conditions are significant factors to affect sustaining or elevating middle class 
identification and how Koreans rank their own social status.
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Introduction
The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s had a profound impact on the 
middle class in Korea. However, to what extent and precisely how the middle 
class was affected by the crisis remains to be investigated (Hsiao 2006). The 
1997 economic crisis greatly impacted Korean society as a whole, and the 
middle class in particular. The economic crisis struck suddenly for most 
Koreans, but there had already been many changes in Korean life during the 
1990s. The downfall of socialist regimes, accelerating globalization, and the 
sway of neo-liberalism were just a few examples. These changes along with 
the economic crisis had a profound effect on the Korean middle class (Yang 
2006).
The general proposition on the impact of the financial crisis on the 
middle class is that it influenced the speed and course of its formation and 
growth, but that the crisis did not altogether stop new members from 
entering it. It may have slowed down the development of various class 
segments, or may even have led to the shrinking of the new middle class but 
the middle classes as a whole did not disappear as some have speculated. The 
financial crisis has had a greater impact on the life chances of the middle 
classes in relation to upward mobility (Hsiao 2006).  
Over the years, the Korean middle class has expanded through the 
country’s economic development process. The middle class in Korea has been 
outcome of the rapid economic development since 1960s. Korea experienced 
steady economic growth until the financial crisis in 1997. As a consequence 
of rapid economic development over the past four decades, a large middle 
class has gradually emerged. In Korea the number of clerical, managerial, 
professional and technical workers, increased as fast as, industrial manual 
workers. The working class increased from a mere 8.9 percent in 1960 to 34.7 
percent in 1990, and the middle class has grown threefold from 15.5 percent 
to 46.6 percent during the same period (Hong 1992). The social class in 
Koreathat garnered the most benefits from the economic growth in the 1980s 
was the urban middle class. In short, the middle class enjoyed a significant 
improvement in its standard of living (Koo 1993). 
Following the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, traditions and 
institutions of East Asian countries have come under strong pressure to 
change. The “East Asian model of capitalism,” which emphasizes government 
intervention and long-term relationships instead of markets, has come to be 
regarded as a problem (Jung and Cheon 2006). The International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) program applied to Korea consisted of three elements: (1) 
macro-economic retrenchment, (2) market opening, and (3) structural 
reform (Shin and Chang 2005). The financial crisis in 1997 fundamentally 
transformed the density of the middle class, in that the prospects of this class 
became less secure than ever before. The financial-cum-economic crisis 
affected the middle class in two ways. First, the number of middle class jobs 
was reduced by economic restructuring and structural adjustment with firms. 
The IMF demanded the Korean government to make four major reforms: 
financial sector restructuring, corporate sector restructuring, privatization of 
public corporations, and an enhancement of flexibility in the labor market. 
This resulted in the mass layoff of blue and white collar employees. Secondly, 
companies which barely escaped bankruptcy began to drastically reduce the 
number of employees to reduce labor costs. Thus, the portion of those in the 
middle income strata reduced drastically after the economic crisis (Shin 
2010).   
According to Shin’s study, after the financial crisis, the reduction of the 
middle class jobs mostly took place in managerial and supervisory positions 
right after the financial crisis in late 1997. While job insecurity of the middle 
class was diminished, the job insecurity of the irregular middle class was 
maintained at a high level. The number of those in managerial positions 
returned to normal levels in 2000, but those who were dismissed could not 
return to their previous jobs. Mass layoffs of core members of the middle 
class fostered the public fears of the middle class collapsing right after the 
financial crisis. Now, the logic went, nobody could be safe from being laid off 
(Shin 2010). 
Most studies on the middle class after the financial crisis in Korea agree 
that middle class polarization and collapse of the middle class were 
consequences of the crisis (Lee and Lee 2001; SERI 2006; Nam 2007; Hong 
and Kim 2008). According to recent studies after financial crisis, income 
distribution takes a sudden turn for a worse, meaning growing income 
inequality has brought about the “decline of the middle class” and 
“polarization of stratification” in Korean society (Lee and Lee 2001; Choi 
2002; Cho 2005; Hong 2006; Hong and Kim 2008; Nam 2009b).
The impact of the economic crisis on the middle class was not reflected 
in a change in their absolute number or their objective attributes, but rather 
in their subjective identities and collective ethos. It has been observed that 
the middle class is much more status-anxiety driven: they express greater 
sense of insecurity and even a fear of losing status, and they are less upwardly 
mobile (Hsiao 2006). Class identification refers to subjective aspects of class 
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which may or may not coincide with objective economic class. Previous 
studies reveal that education, the occupation, and family income have 
independent effects upon class identification (Hodge and Treiman 1968). 
After the Korean economic crisis, the portion of middle class identification 
holders declined rapidly. Furthermore, people who regarded themselves as 
the members of the middle class decreased from 41 percent before the 
economic crisis in 1996 to 28 percent ten years after the economic crisis in 
2007 (Nam 2009a).
An economic crisis is directly linked to an employment crisis and a 
social crisis. The fear about an economic crisis comes from the fact that the 
crisis will inevitably bring about unemployment and cause social dissolution. 
During such a period in Korea, economic crisis was the crucial factor 
underlying various social problems such as the dissolution of families, suicide 
and crimes (Lee 2004). The impacts of the economic crisis have produced 
various social risks such as unemployment, a decrease in income and 
property, increase job instability, and family disbandment (Park 2003). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between middle 
class identification / self-identified social stratum and social risks with a 
special emphasis on the impact of the Korean economic crisis in 1997. First, 
this study examines the degree and range of social risks such as 
unemployment, decrease in income, decrease in property, and dissolution of 
family bonds. Second, it explores the effects of social risks on middle class 
identification and self-ranked social stratification around the financial crisis 
in Korea. This paper is particularly concerned with the question of which 
kinds of social risks around the economic crisis affect middle class 
identification and self-ranked social stratum. The findings of this research 
reveal the significant social risks which support or reduce middle class 
identification and self-ranked social stratum. 
Literature Review
Social Risks 
Social risks are defined as misfortunes causing income loss, such as 
illness, old age, unemployment, and industrial accidents (Esping-Andersen 
1999). The development of welfare states was originally aimed at the public 
management of such social risks. In its ideal form, the main business of the 
welfare state was to provide for needs which were not adequately met 
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through the market-interruption of income (retirement, unemployment, 
sickness, or disability), and the mismatch between income and need during 
the life cycle (e.g. child endowment) or for needs where state provision was 
widely recognized as desirable (e.g. high-valued services such as health care 
or education) (Taylor-Gooby 2004).
Social risks are building blocks of welfare regimes. Some risks are purely 
random, but most occur with sociological regularity. These can be classified 
along three dist inct axes; “class r isks,” “ l i fe-course r isks,” and 
“intergenerational risks.” The notion of “risk classes” implies that the 
likelihood of a social risk is unevenly distributed across social strata. The 
unskilled are particularly vulnerable to low earnings and unemployment. 
Social risks are also distributed unequally across the life course. Poverty is 
especially concentrated in childhood (particularly in large families) and in 
old age (because of a decline in earning). The life chances of some groups are 
systematically inferior. Such inequalities appear normally as “class risks,” but 
if they are also inherited, the problem is one of intergenerational risk 
transmission (Taylor-Gooby 2000). They can all be internalized in the family, 
allocated to the market, or absorbed by the welfare state, but it can easily be 
demonstrated that class and intergenerational risks require a welfare state 
solution (Esping-Andersen 1999).  
In an ideal typical post–industrial society, economic growth rates are 
lower and more uncertain. Technological changes mean that stable 
employment in the manufacturing sector is no longer available on a mass 
scale, with implications for the job security of semi-and unskilled workers 
and for class structure and the political interests associated with it. Stricter 
competition promoted by economic globalization has advanced labor market 
flexibility (Taylor-Gooby 2004). 
 Comparatively speaking, the concept of risk has been less popular 
among social and public policy analysts in East Asia. Since the Asian 
financial crisis, “risk” was associated with political instability, economic 
uncertainty, and vulnerability (Chan et al. 2010). As the economic recession 
continues, social conflict is becoming a hot issue in Korea. Before the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, social risk or social cohesion was not taken seriously in 
Korean society. It was only in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the late 
1990s that social cohesion drew public attention.
According to previous studies, after the economic crisis the Korean labor 
market was composed of full-time workers, temporary workers, and day 
laborers, Female and elderly male workers increased after Korea’s economic 
crisis. In other words, the labor market’s heterogeneity grew and social 
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cohesion dwindled. Family conflict and divorce greatly increased as the heads 
of households lost their job. The increase of suicide, crime, juvenile 
delinquency was most likely in connection with the increase of 
unemployment, divorce, and social inequality since the economic crisis (Lee 
2004). 
A study by Keum and Cho (2001) using Korean Labor and Income 
Panels Study (KLIPS) in 1998 and 1999 suggest that the job retention rate of 
the Korean labor market during theeconomic crisis decreased to a level that 
the U.S. labor market has never experienced during the past two decades. 
Their comparison of two-year retention rates before and after the economic 
crisis suggest that job stabilities have been conspicuously aggravated, 
especially for cohorts of long tenure, irregular job, old age, service and sales 
jobs (Keum and Cho 2001). 
Nahm’s study (2002) examines the trend and the determinants of 
recurrent unemployment after the economic crisis. Actually, the rate of 
recurrent unemployment is still higher than before the economic crisis. 
Recurrent unemployment has been repeated among less educated male 
workers and among both younger and older workers, except those workers 
who have reached theirprime. Nonstandard workers who moved out of 
unemployment are apt to be the victims of recurrent unemployment. This 
implies that nonstandard jobs rapidly increased after economic crisis, and 
functioned as a trap, not as a stepping stone in Korea (Nahm 2002).
The major post-crisis changes in Korea’s labor market can be 
summarized as an increase in unemployment and reduced job creation, an 
increase in wage and income inequalities, and continued confrontational 
labor relations (Kim 2007). Skill-based technological change is one of the 
factors for the relatively poor employment conditions of the unskilled after 
the economic crisis. The increasing employment share of skilled workers 
accompanied with a rising wage premium for education implies that labor 
demand has shifted toward skilled workers (Shin 2007).
Widespread job insecurity, along with a worsening job market, has 
pushed Korean society into a corner. Due to uncertainties in society, people 
have been obsessed with the growth rate and real estate investment. This is 
because they have often witnessed people being driven into poverty the 
moment they lose their job, due to the insufficient social services designed to 
protect the unemployed and elderly (Shin 2010). 
There are many recent studies on social risk in Korean society. They are 
focused on poverty, instability of labor market, the responsibilities of social 
welfare, and the role of the state, especially in the domains of families and 
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women (Song 2002; Kim 2006; Yoon 2006; Ju 2008; Chung 2009). When 
Korea confronted the financial crisis in 1997, the country’s welfare policy 
systems were insufficient and underdeveloped, and under rapidly changing 
social and economic conditions, the government had to manage social risks 
(Ju 2008). Previous studies point out that social risks have proliferated widely 
in Korean society since the economic crisis in 1997. The increase of 
unemployment and job insecurity is two remarkable social risks that have 
emerged after the Korean economic crisis. 
Class Identification
 Subjective class identification has been given a variety of meanings. For 
some it appears to be a substitute for class consciousness (cf. Hodge and 
Teiman, 1968; Guest 1974); for others it is treated as only a component or 
partial indicator of class consciousness (cf. Morris and Murphy 1966; 
Lopreato and Hazelrigg 1972; Jackman and Jackman 1973). Little distinction 
has been made between “class” and “status” consciousness, and class 
identification often has been used to cover both of these constructs. For 
example, Jackman and Jackman (1973) refer to subjective class identification 
as “the individual’s perception of his own position in status hierarchy.” 
The study of class identity and awareness has a long tradition in 
stratification research (Centers 1949; Hodge and Treiman 1968; Vanneman 
and Pampel 1977; Jackman and Jackman 1983; Davis and Robinson 1988; 
Wright 1989; Hout 2008). Class identification is a subjective assessment of 
the way in which individuals define their social class position. Most people 
understand class labels (Jackman and Jackman 1983) and routinely place 
themselves in class categories (Moorhouse 1976; Wright 1985; Evans et al. 
1992). Nevertheless, self-reports of social class are often poor measures of 
objective class position in most societies (Kelly and Evans 1995; Oddsson 
2010). In this regard, it is a well-known finding that people often identify 
with the middle classes, regardless of their economic position (Evans and 
Kelly 2004). 
Explanations for middle class identification among the working class 
extend back several decades. Goldthorpe et al. (1969)’s affluent worker thesis 
suggests that improved economic conditions in mid-20th century Britain 
lifted workers’ perception of their class position in society. Recent research 
demonstrates that a substantial portion of people in high class positions also 
tend to see themselves as belonging to the middle class in both affluent 
Western countries (Kelly and Evans 1995; Oddsson 2010) and less affluent 
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countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans et al. 1992).
Particularly relevant to this “middle class” identity bias is “reference 
group theory,” which contends that people perceive their class standing by 
comparing themselves to others in their social environment. Some argue that 
when people make references to the “middle class” they tend to consider 
similarities in consumption patterns rather than production relations 
(Clement and Myles 1994). From this view, many working class people 
identify with the middle class because they perceive that they have a very 
similar life style. People may simply be less concerned with occupational 
differences and more concerned with economic rewards (Andersen and Cutis 
2012).  
Wright (1997) surmises that economic development may influence class 
identity and consciousness. Kikkawa (2000) provides a similar explanation 
for a decline in class identification in Japan that corresponded with a period 
of vast economic growth. He described the situation as people having lost 
sight of rational judgment for class identification because of high economic 
growth. According to Seiyama (1990), the rapid expansion of the economic 
pie brought about by high level growth from the 1950s on gave rise to a 
shared attitude towards affluence and led to an increase in middle 
consciousness (Shirahase 2010). Evans and Kelly (2004)’s examination of 
class identification in 21 nations between 1987 and 1998 reveals that 
economic prosperity strengthens people’s sense of “upper class” 
identification. On average, regardless of their economic position, people in 
richer countries tend to report higher in the class hierarchy than do people 
from poorer countries. Evans and Kelly (2004) tentatively conclude that 
living in more affluent societies might raise people’s subjective images of their 
place in the class structure. Economic growth can generate higher 
expectations for consumption and social mobility, especially among those in 
lower classes (Logan 1977). 
A study on economic inequality and class identification in Japan 
(Shirahase 2010) reveals that by the 2000s, middle class identification was not 
particularly strong; what characterized Japan instead was a great divergence 
between attitudes towards class identification and the actual level of the 
income gap. Japanese young people in particular identified with this at a 
significantly lower level than other age groups. Economic stagnation in Japan 
has since directly affected young people who find themselves in a weak 
position in the labor market and unemployment, and the lack of standard 
work among young people isan important social priority in Japan (Shirahase 
2010).  
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A previous study on the determinants of class identification suggests that 
occupation has traditionally been regarded as a key element of 
socioeconomic status in U.S., and an evaluation of how Americans assign 
occupations to classes constitute a basic step in assessing their understanding 
of social class terms (Jackman 1979). Vanneman and Pampel (1977) conclude 
that occupational prestige is more a middle-class concern, with little 
importance for manual workers. Hodge and Treiman (1968) reveal that 
education, the main earner’s occupation, and family income have 
independent effects upon class identification and indexes based upon the 
occupational level of one’s class identification, which are no less important 
than those made by education, occupation, and income. Thus, class 
identification rests not only upon one’s own location in the status structure 
but upon the socioeconomic level of one’s acquaintance. Ishida (2003) has 
studied the extent to which class identification in Japan, the U.S. and 
Germany can beexplained by objective indicators such as level of education, 
social status and income. In Japan, as in Germany, class identification can 
largely be explained by social position represented by occupation and 
education, and the level of education is found to have the greatest impact on 
class identification among Americans (Shirahase 2010). 
Previous studies on class identification in Korea found that the 
determinants of class identification are occupation, income, education (Kim 
and Choi 1983; Chang 1996), and that class identification is associated with 
possessions of specific items of consumption (Cha 1997). A recent study 
reveals that middle class identification declined rapidly after the economic 
crisis in 1997 (Nam 2009b).  
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the influences of the 
economic crisis on class identification in Korean society since 1997. This 
paper asks to what extent people have experienced social risks during and 
around the economic crisis. Moreover, the paper is concerned with the 
question of which kinds of social risks around the economic crisis 
significantly affected class identification and self-ranked social stratum. In 
this research, multiple indicators of subjective social status are analyzed 
(Kluegel 1977). Multiple indicators approaches are demonstrated by 
comparing the regression of the single-item measure and a composite 
measure of subjective class on education, income, occupational status, and 
property. This analysis reveals that consistent social risk factors affect the 
multi-dimensional self-ranked social strata. 
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Data and Measure
Sample
The data used here were collected by nationwide survey carried out in 
2007 as a public survey on the social changes occurring after financial crisis. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with males and females aged 19 and 
above over a period of two weeks in September 2007. The total functional 
sample size was 1,005. The sample was selected through a process of multi-
stage area cluster sampling. The survey was conducted by the Institute for 
Social Development and Policy Research (ISDPR) at Seoul National 
University. Table1 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the 
survey target population. 
Variables
Social risks
Social risks were measured by various life events thatthe respondents or 
their family members experienced around the financial crisis in 1997. These 
included social risks such as income decline, decrease in property, 
unemployment, business bankruptcy or credit delinquency, job instability, 
deterioration of one’s health, depression, and family disbandment. 
Class identification
To measure the respondents’ subjective social status, the study used two 
variables that indicate multidimensional aspects of subjective social status: 
middle class identification and self-ranked social stratum. Middle class 
identification was measured by whether the respondents regarded themselves 
as a member of the middle class. Self-ranked social stratum was measured by 
sense of belonging among the 10 levels of social stratum from the lowest 
stratum (score 1) to the highest stratum (score 10) in Korean society. This 
paper analyzed the multiple self-ranked social strata. Multiple self-ranked 
social strata included single and composite measures of subjective social 
strata, which indicated social ranks on income, property, occupational status, 
and education or culture.  
Class
Class was divided into three categories. The literature identifies four 
           Social Risks and Class Identification after the Financial Crisis in Korea 247
categories of class: the upper middle class (the upper stratum of the middle 
class: professional, managerial workers), the new middle class (white-collar 
workers), and the old middle class (petite bourgeoisie: the self-employed, and 
small-scale employers), and the working class. However, for the purpose of 
this analysis, this paper treated the upper middle class and the new middle 
class as a single group because of the small size of the sample. For regression 
analysis, the class variable was converted to dummy variables, taking the 
working class as the reference category.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Of the 1,005 respondents analyzed, 49.7 percent were men (N=499) and 
50.4 percent were woman (N=506). In terms of age groups, the sample 
consist of 22.4 percent (N=225) individuals in their twenties, 24.2 percent 
(N=243) in their thirties, 22.4 percent (N=225) in their forties, and 31.0 
percent (N=312) in their fifties and over. In terms of education, 
approximately 42 percent of the respondents received a college education or 
more. In terms of class group categories, the sample consisted of 1.3 percent 
(N=13) from the upper middle class, 17.5 percent (N=176) from the new 
middle class, 25.7 percent (N=258) from the old middle class and 18.6 
percent (N=246) from the working class. Since the sample size for the upper 
middle class was too small, we combined it with the new middle class 
category. The other category (31.0 percent; N=312), which included the 
unemployed and housewives, was excluded fromthe class classification.
Social Risks around Financial Crisis
Economic crises and recessions harm people economically, such as 
decreases in income and property, unemployment and withering economic 
activities in their everyday life. Such negative life events influence the 
individual’s everyday life, and at the same time cause various social problems 
and negative societal effects. Thus, economic crisis often leads to increased 
social pathology cases such as depression or desire to die, family dissolution, 
deterioration in health, credit-delinquency, and crime.  
The life events around the financial crises are based upon responses to 
the question, “Did you or your family ever experience the following life 
events, such as decrease in property, income decline, unemployment, family 
disbandment (divorce, separation, or leaving home), bankruptcy or credit-
delinquency, a deterioration of health, depression ordesire to diearound the 
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economic crisis?” The results of the interviews showed that 48.3 percent 
mentioned income decline, 36.4 percent mentioned adecrease in property, 
19.2 percent mentioned unemployment, 11.7 percent mentioned bankruptcy 
or credit-delinquency, 16.5 percent mentioned deterioration of health, and 
9.3 percent mentioned depression or a desire to die. Those who have never 
experienced such negative life events amount to about 40 percent of the 
respondents, while the rest of those surveyed experienced at least one 
misfortune in their own or family members’ life around the financial crisis. 
The accumulation of social risks among people was a noticeable result of 
the survey; various social risks, such as decrease in income and property, 
unemployment, family dissolution, deterioration in one’s health, credit-
delinquency, and depression overlapped at the same time in individual and 
family lives around financial crisis. The portion of people who experience 
three and more social risks at the same time was the highest (22 percent), 
followed by those with two social risks (19.6 percent).The portion of people 
who experienced only one social risk displayed the lowest level (17.1 
percent). Thus, almost 42 percent ofthe respondents suffered from two or 
more social risks around the financial crisis. 
Table 1 shows the mean number of social risks by age, education, 
household income and class. In terms of age group, people who are in their 
forties have experienced the widest scope of social risks, and respondents in 
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their thirties or twenties have experienced the lowest social risks. Thus, the 
older have suffered from more social risks than the younger generation. A 
comparison of the mean number of social risks between household income 
categories reveals that people who earned less than two million won 
experienced more widespread social risks than people who earned more than 
four million won during the economic crisis. These results show that low 
income groups were vulnerable toward social risks like income decline, a 
decrease in property, unemployment, deterioration of one’s health, credit 
delinquency, depression, and the dissolution of families. People who were 
older and earned a lower income went through the painful experiences of 
widespread social risks after the financial crisis.    
Effects of Social Risks on middle class identification 
The question now is whether social risks measured by various life events 
influenced the middle class identification. What kinds of life events or 
conditions have significantly impacted middle class identification in Korea? 
To answer these questions, this study conducted a binary logistic analysis 
taking middle class identification as a dependent variable, and gender, age, 
education, family income, work status, class categories, and social risks as 
independent variables. As shown in Table 1, the college educated and those 
with higher family income are more likely to identify themselves as middle 
class. Those who are in their thirties tend to think more negatively about 
their own middle class identification than people in their fifties and over do. 
Work status and class categories were not significant. Those who have 
experienced unemployment were less likely to think of themselves as 
belonging to the middle class. Unemployment proves to be the only 
significant influential social risk factor for the respondents to abandon their 
middle class identification. In short, Koreans tend to be seriously affected by 
economic-oriented factors among the life events they experienced. 
Unemployment around the economic crisis associates negatively with middle 
class identification.
The Effects of Social Risks on the Self-ranked social stratum 
after Financial Crisis 
Then, what factors do affect the self-ranked social stratum ten years after 
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economic crisis? The self-ranked social stratum means the subjective sense of 
belonging among the ten levels of social groups composed of a hierarchy 
from bottom to top. This section will first analyze the composite index of self-
ranked social stratum. The composite index consists of self-ranked social 
stratum on income, property, social status, and education. 
In order to explore the factors that affect the composite index of self-
ranked social stratum the study conducted a regression analysis. The higher 
family income, the higher he or she is likely to have self-ranked social 
stratum. People who are in their thirties and forties are more likely to have 
lower self-ranked social stratum than people in their fifties and over. The 
higher educated, the higher he or she is likely to hold the self-ranked social 
stratum (Model 1). Work status and class categories were not significant. 
TABLE 2
The Results of logistic regression of middle class identification of 
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However, social risks such as decreases in income, unemployment, decreases 
in job stability and a deterioration of health are negatively associated with 
self-ranked social stratum ten years after the economic crisis (Model 3). 
People who experienced a decrease in income, unemployment, a 
decrease in job stability, and poor health around the financial crisis possessed 
a lower self-ranked stratum ten years after the financial crisis than those who 
did not suffer such kinds of social risks. Economic factors such as a decrease 
in income, unemployment and increasing job instability strongly influenced 
the self-ranked social stratum even ten years after the financial crisis. People 
who were laid off or suffered from job instability around the economic crisis 
failed to recover their self-ranked stratum after ten years, while those who 
suffered from deteriorated health also had a lower self-ranked social stratum 
ten years after the financial crisis. These results demonstrate that social risks 
TABLE 3
OLS Regression of Composite Index of Self-ranked Social Stratum ten 
years after the Economic Crisis on Social Risks and Socioeconomic 
Variables
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related with employment such as job loss and job instability have long-lasting 
impacts on self-ranked social stratum.  
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS regression of multiple indicators 
inself-ranked social stratum on income, property, social status, and education 
ten years after the economic crisis. In terms of self-ranked social stratum on 
income, those who have higher family income are more likely to have a 
higher self-ranked social stratum, as this study first predicted. People who 
experienced social risks such as family disbandment, deterioration in health, 
or a decrease in job stability held a lower self-ranked social stratum on 
income. 
In terms of self-ranked social stratum toward property, those who were 
in their thirties and forties had lower self-ranked social stratum than those 
are in their fifties and over. The higher education level achieved and the 
higher family income earned, the higher likely the respondent was held a 
higher self-ranked social stratum on property. The members of the old 
middle class had a higher self-ranked social stratum on property. The social 
risks such unemployment, deterioration in health, and a decrease in job 
stability around the economic crisis had a negative effect on self-ranked 
social stratum on property. With regard to self-ranked social stratum on 
occupational status, respondents the thirties felt themselves belonging to 
lower subjective social stratums than those in their fifties and over. The group 
of respondents who have suffered from deteriorations in health and a 
decrease in job stability tended to have lower self-ranked social stratum on 
social status. 
In terms of self-ranked social stratum on education and culture, those in 
their thirties and forties were more likely to have a lower self-ranked social 
stratum than people in their fifties and over. People with higher education, 
higher family income and regular work status tended to have a higher self-
ranked social stratum on education and culture. The social risks also 
negatively influenced the self-ranked social stratum. The experience of a 
decrease in income around the economic crisis had a negative association 
with self-ranked social stratum on education and culture.
In general, those with higher education and family income were more 
likely to hold higher self-ranked social stratum on almost every dimension of 
subjective social strata. Age groups were also significant, and people in their 
thirties and forties tended to have lower self-ranked social stratum than those 
older than them. Class categories such as the old middle class had a positive 
association with self-ranked social stratum on property. The group of 
respondents with regular work was more likely to have a higher self-ranked 
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TABLE 4
OLS Regression of Multiple Self-ranked Social Stratum ten years 













Gender (male) -.152(-.023) .087(.028) -.005(-.002) .003(.001)
Age (20s) .136(.017) -.208(-.055) -.041(-.011) -.174(-.044)
Age (30s) -.400(-.051) -.679(-.187)*** -.428(-.120)** -.468(-.122)**
Age (40s) .297(.037) -.376(-.101)** -.193(-.053) -.303(-.077)*
Education 
(high school)
.401(.058) .394(.123)** .417(.132)** .815(.241)***
Education 
(college) 
.696(.102) .851(.268)*** .992(.318)*** 1.501(.448)***
Family income .003(.185)*** .002(.238)*** .002(.280)*** .002(.226)***
Work status
(regular worker)
.193(.029) -.125(-.040) -.096(-.031) .005(.002)*
New Middle Class -.222(-.026) -.038(-.009) .133(.034) .020(.005)
Old Middle Class .319(.042) .300(.084)* .194(.055) .070(.019)
Decrease in 
property
.182(.026) -.161(-.049) .079(.025) .286(.083)*
Decrease in 
Income
-.225(-.033) -.196(-.063) -.165(-.054) -.342(-.103)**
Unemployment .001(.000) -.388(-.098)** -.209(-.054) -.142(-.034)
Dissolution of 
family
-1.098(-.071)* -.206(-.028) -.329(-.046) -.176(-.023)
Bankruptcy, Credit 
delinquency
.581(.056) -.078(-.016) -.103(-.022) .288(.056)
Deterioration of 
health
-1.072(-.119)** -.412(-.098)** -.322(-.078)* -.261(-.059)
Depression, 
death wish
1.709(.148) .237(.044) .104(.020) .163(.029)
Decrease in job 
stability
-.871(-.110)** -.238(-.065)* -.264(-.073)* -.228(-.059)
Constant 3.253*** 3.659*** 3.325*** 3.248***
R2 .100 .205 .238 .231
N 991 991 991 991
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social stratum on education and culture than those with a non-regular work 
status. Some social risks had negative association with self-ranked social 
strata. Social risks such as deterioration in health and adecrease in job 
stability in particular had a bad influence on self-ranked social stratum on 
income, property, and occupational status.  
Conclusion
The middle class has enjoyed significant improvement in its standard of 
living throughout Korea’s economic development process. The financial crisis 
in 1997 fundamentally transformed the density of the middle class and 
middle class identification declined rapidly in Korea. Thus, it seems that the 
economic crisis has had a more considerable negative impacton the lives of 
ordinary Koreans. 
Since the late 1990s when the Korean economy faced financial crisis, the 
problem of a non-regular workforce has become one of the most 
controversial issues in Korean society. The number of non-regular workers 
reached almost six million people in 2011, a number which constitutes 33.3% 
of the total workforce (KNSO 2012), and on average, non-regular workers 
earned only 59.5 percentof regular workers’ wages monthly (MOEL 2010). In 
general, non-regular workers have to work in unstable, lower-paid and poor 
working conditions without proper fringe benefits and insurance. The 
conditions for workers vary by the size of the firms and non-regular workers 
in larger firms are better off than regular workers in small and medium-sized 
firms with respect to wage and working conditions. In fact, over 70 percent of 
non-regular workers work in small firms with less than 30 employees (KNSO 
2012). 
Which changes influenced the decline of middle class identification 
around the economic crisis? If we control the socioeconomic variables such 
as gender, age, education and family income, unemployment was the 
strongest factor in reducing middle class identification significantly. 
Unemployment is the only negative life experience so disastrous to have an 
effect on people abandoning middle class identification. In light of these 
results, this study recognizes what impact middle class identification has on 
employment in Korean society. 
The analysis of the relationship between social risks and the self-ranked 
social stratum also reveal the negative impact of the economic crisis. Ten 
years after the crisis, job instability has been the longest lasting consequence 
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in Koreans self-identifying themselves with a low social stratum, while 
personal well-being such as illness around the financial crisis has also 
consistently influenced how people self-identify themselves. The multiple 
indicators of self-identified social stratum on income, property, and 
occupational status are commonly associated negatively with job instability 
and deterioration in one’s health. Subjective socioeconomic status has been 
associated with self-reported health even after controlling for the traditional 
measure of SES (Operario et al. 2004; Demakakos 2008).    
Those who are in their thirties and forties are likely to have a lower self-
ranked social stratum. The economic crisis in Korea has directly affected 
people in their thirties and forties who have been economically active in the 
labor market, but have found themselves in danger of being laid off. They 
were in twenties and thirties around the economic crisis, and also met with a 
difficulty in finding employment at that time. These results lead us to the 
conclusion that employment and job stability are the crucial factors holding 
up middle-class identification and self-ranked social stratum even after ten 
years have passed since the economic crisis. Physical health status was also 
significant in having a positive effect on self-ranked social stratum. 
People who have regular work are likely to have a higher self-ranked 
social stratum on education and culture. After the economic crisis, there was 
a drastic increase in non-regular workers who suffered from job instability 
and low income. The positive association between regular work status and 
self-ranked social stratum on education and culture implies that regular work 
status has become representative of an advantageous social standing.
The impact of the economic crisis in Korea was enormous in economic, 
social and personal terms. The various social risks which one and one’s family 
underwent during and around the economic crisis had important effects on 
many personal life. This research suggests that middle class identification and 
self-identified social stratum are good barometers to understand how 
Koreans have been affected by social risks since the financial crisis. 
Recently, social policies in the flexible labor market have been making 
rapid progress. The workforce policies of the government were meant to solve 
the mismatch of manpower supply and demand by increasing non-regular 
workers. These flexible labor market policies, including flexible employment, 
dismissal, shift work, and atypical work have created an increasing number of 
non-regular workers and have deteriorated their job stability. These days, 
except for the self-employed (the old middle class), all classes, including the 
new middle class and the working class, are at risk of job instability. However, 
no solid active labor market policies aimed at creating good jobs and 
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improving human capital have been implemented yet. In order to manage 
social risks, the Korean government needs to carry out an expansion of 
public welfare, promote an active labor market policy and activation policy, 
socialize healthcare, and cultivate a new social security system.
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